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CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
CNO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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CMC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
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Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, a.i., CHRISTOPHER W. MURRAY FOR
REASON 1.4B/D

[1](#)1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: As we prepare for the upcoming visit to Washington by the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and Director General of the EU Military Staff Lieutenant General David Leakey, it might be useful to take stock of the EU's steady advance towards its goal of becoming a global security provider and how we are working with the EU on defense and security topics. EU Member States, led by France, now often prefer to use the EU, rather than NATO, to address security issues in situations where U.S. military power is not essential to mission success. We have therefore adapted by engaging directly with the EU on defense issues on an ad hoc basis, striving to support NATO from the outside as we simultaneously advance our interests inside the Alliance. Our EU interlocutors hope that our increasingly pragmatic approach portends revitalized U.S.-EU relations and a creative view of transatlantic security cooperation.

[1](#)2. (C/NF) The European approach to combating piracy and the Georgia crisis made manifest that there will be cases when we see the value of the EU, rather than NATO, taking the lead on security operations. Pragmatism in U.S.-EU security cooperation reflects the continuing growth of the European Union's independent capacity and ambition to act militarily and also helps address the blockage in NATO-EU cooperation. As an adaptation to events, however, it is an essentially

reactive posture. By proactively engaging the European Union on security topics before an EU consensus is reached, we can regain the diplomatic initiative in transatlantic relations and better leverage EU assets. This approach implies authorizing regular military-to-military engagement with the EU on issues from UN peacekeeping to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. If we do, we may soon have a sustained opportunity to use the EU's own logic and structures to motivate Europe to adequately fund its own defense and deploy larger forces to more challenging missions. END SUMMARY

¶3. (C/NF) In the 1990s, the U.S. effort to motivate NATO allies to contribute more to the common defense coincided with a growing European realization that the EU required viable military structures in order to be a credible international actor. Post-Cold War defense spending reductions by European Union member states prompted U.S. concern that NATO was a two-tiered Alliance, with the U.S. shouldering the responsibility for making the Article V mutual defense clause of the Washington Treaty credible as the only ally capable of undertaking worldwide high-intensity conflict. Our EU allies seemed content to enjoy their peace dividend and embrace a limited military role until the Balkans crisis resulting from the breakup of Yugoslavia made clear that the EU was neither politically nor militarily ready for demanding peacemaking tasks in Europe.

¶4. (C/NF) The 1990's failure of UN peacekeeping in the Balkans, and the inability of the EU to develop a credible European response to either Bosnia or Kosovo, eventually resulted in NATO taking action, with the U.S. playing the dominant military and political roles in the Alliance's first-ever peacekeeping operations, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo. Europe's inability to act without U.S. leadership provided Europeans with a strong impetus to develop a credible and independent European Union military capacity. France provided much of the initial leadership as the EU began to develop a security and defense personality of its own.

¶5. (C/NF) In 1998, in what became known as the "St. Malo declaration," the UK and France issued a joint summit statement that the EU needed its own European Security and Defense Policy. A few months later, NATO heads of state and government decided at the Washington Summit to develop arrangements to provide the EU with access to NATO assets and capabilities in situations where the Alliance was not involved; these "Berlin-Plus" arrangements were finally agreed in 2003. Early EU military operations in the Balkans saw EU forces taking over from NATO in stabilized situations. These missions were comparatively straightforward, small-scale, and low-risk.

¶6. (C/NF) Initial success in Macedonia and Bosnia gave the EU confidence to tackle increasingly distant and challenging missions. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the EU focuses on security sector reform; in the Palestinian territories the task is police training and in Indonesia's Aceh province the EU's mission was conflict prevention and stabilization. These missions were usually limited in size and scope; however, by 2008, the EU was ready to deploy 3,700 troops to Chad in a complex year-long protection mission that was one of eleven European Union security operations then underway.

Looking First to the EU

¶7. (C/NF) European leaders' commitment to the development of European defense mirrors the enthusiasm of their voters. Department of State Office of Opinion Research polling data from March 2009 indicates that adults in the five key Western European EU Member States prefer for the EU, rather than NATO, to take decisions on European security matters. Even in traditionally "Euro-skeptic" UK, 44 percent of adults polled felt the EU should make the most important decisions about the security of Europe, with 35 percent favoring NATO. In France, Germany, Italy and Spain, over two-thirds of voters desire decision-making on European security issues to

take place in the European Union, according to this one poll.

¶8. (C/NF) It is no surprise, therefore, that European EU Member States increasingly look to EU structures to respond to crises -- including missions to be executed nationally or in other fora -- as they pledged to do at the June 2006 European Council. The following month, during the Summer 2006 Israeli war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, EU member states organized their greatly expanded troop contributions to UNIFIL through EU structures. While troop contributions were made by member states to the UN, the key consultations and decision-making took place in the EU. Under the 2008 French EU Presidency, EU diplomatic leadership on Georgia culminated in the deployment of an EU Monitoring Mission in October 2008. In December, the EU took on its first naval mission, dispatching a maritime task force to fight piracy off the Somali coast. EU discussions have now set the stage for a possible deployment of European Gendarmerie Forces to Afghanistan.

Leveraging EU Assets

¶9. (C/NF) Because all EU military missions have an important institution-building aspect, the key architects of the European Security and Defense Policy -- France, Germany and the UK -- cannot afford to let a major EU military mission fail. When Europeans participate in NATO missions, however, it is with the implicit understanding that the United States is ultimately responsible for mission results. As a result, the Europeans have little incentive to adequately contribute to specific NATO mission success or the overall defense of Europe. Conversely, because Europe is solely accountable for the results of EU missions, EU Member States are obliged to make firm resource commitments for EU military missions. This dynamic enables us to effectively leverage EU military assets when the EU takes the lead and holds itself responsible for mission success.

"Permanent Arrangements" That Can Last: Beyond Berlin-Plus

¶10. (C/NF) Many in the EU now view the NATO-EU arrangements as out of date. At the start of the French EU Presidency in July 2008, EU HiRep Javier Solana and French FM Kouchner publicly articulated their desire for a new NATO-EU framework that envisions NATO and EU forces operating side-by-side as equals. France used its EU Presidency to seek practical formulae for NATO-EU and U.S.-EU dialogue and cooperation that depart from the previous approach, but increase transparency and create real opportunities for cooperation. EU leaders, increasingly skeptical about relations with Turkey, have no confidence that NATO and the EU can ever again reach consensus on a NATO-EU operation under the "Berlin-plus" Framework. Our Allies -- with the ironic exception of the Turks and Greeks who make Berlin-plus unusable -- are keen to find a new formula for NATO-EU cooperation. Until that happens, however, we will need to rely on an effective bilateral approach to working with the EU on shared defense and security goals.

EU Aspirations Depend Upon U.S. Support

¶11. (C/NF) The U.S. derives benefits from EU aspirations to a leading role in diplomacy and international security, as Europeans increasingly understand that a strong transatlantic connection is essential to EU success in their Common Foreign and Security Policy venture. EU leaders seem to have realized the need to favorably differentiate the treatment the EU gives to the U.S., and give us greater access than other EU "strategic partners" such as Russia, India and Brazil. The EU cannot fulfill its ambitions without working closely with the United States, and U.S. leverage and access to EU decision-making therefore increases as the EU becomes more internationally active. Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia made manifest to the EU the requirement to ensure transatlantic unity on security challenges not only by enhancing the existing transatlantic consultative fora, but by better structuring the U.S.-EU dialogue and building transatlantic consensus before the EU determines a course of

action.

U.S.-EU Security Cooperation Today: Deeds Not Wrds

¶12. (C/NF) The atmosphere has also been improved by a growing EU realization of U.S. sincerity in our public statements of support for the European Security and Defense Policy. We helped to prove that support by contributing a contingent of civilian U.S. personnel to the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo -- signing a formal Memorandum of Understanding to enable our contribution -- and our strong political support for the work of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia. Although we had difficulty providing substantive responses to EU Presidency diplomatic approaches as the EU prepared for the Somalia anti-piracy mission, our subsequent active military-to-military cooperation at headquarters and at sea has demonstrated that we can work effectively with EU military missions. General David Petraeus' recent meeting with the EU's Political and Security Committee on Afghanistan (Ref A) was another key milestone in shaping EU perceptions.

Are We Ready For a European Common Defense Market?

¶13. (C/NF) To complement their attempts to advance intra-EU coordination on security operations, EU Member States increasingly look to EU structures to enhance military capabilities. EU Member States established a European Defense Agency to help them research, cooperate, and pool resources for defense transformation. This work might have been exclusively done at NATO, but EU Member States wanted to engage in an EU context, so that their defense industry could benefit from economies of scale; they saw this as complementing our desire to reinforce NATO's collective capability development effort.

¶14. (C/NF) Meanwhile, the European Commission has been working toward the goal of creating a common defense market and unitary defense trade control and procurement regimes. When seen in the context of the slow but seemingly inexorable growth of non-military common market and other EU institutions, it seems evident that this effort will eventually succeed. We will have to engage to ensure that no barriers to U.S. access to the common EU defense market are created; however, a unified defense market could help build military interoperability and increase sales opportunities for the U.S. defense industry.

EU Solicits U.S. Views

¶15. (C/NF) The U.S. and EU already engage in regular consultations on international security topics such as disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. We have done so since 1990, through the U.S.-EU Troika Working Group exchanges launched at the initiative of then-Secretary of State Baker. We have a strong influence on the EU thinking -- and spending. The European Commission's Stability Instrument allocates more than 2 billion Euros for global security and stability programs from 2007 to 2013. In September 2008, European Commission officials asked us to continue to help them prioritize Stability Instrument spending on WMD non-proliferation for the next three years. In January, the European Commission met via video-conference with representatives of several U.S. government agencies to consult on long-term counter-piracy programs. When it comes to operational planning or other tasks requiring military-to-military contacts or expertise, however, we do not have any formal U.S. military liaison arrangement with the EU Military Staff or Military Committee.

Optimally Organizing Ourselves

¶16. (C/NF) We do not have "a seat at the table" in the EU, but we do help shape EU leaders' thinking) and they often seek our input on security issues. It is especially important that we shape EU decision-making and military planning in a way that complements and reinforces NATO when Europe decides to work on defense outside the NATO context. One option would be to establish a formal military liaison

arrangement that ensured effective and timely high-level engagement with the EU Military Staff and EU Military Committee before they finalize military advice to the Political and Security Committee Ambassadors.

¶17. (C/NF) EU HiRep Javier Solana's upcoming visit to Washington, which we understand could include an April 15 call on CJCS Admiral Mullen, provides an opportunity to solicit EU thoughts on structured U.S.-EU military-to-military contact and liaison arrangements that can be pursued the following week during the Director General of the EU Military Staff Lieutenant General David Leakey's meeting with Joint Staff counterparts.

Strengthening NATO through the EU

¶18. (C/NF) One of USEU's key pol-mil objectives is to bolster NATO from the outside. Through bilateral cooperation with the EU on security and defense issues -- as we have recently done on piracy, the Congo, Kosovo and Georgia -- we hope to build EU support for NATO and ensure more effective EU operations. When we fail to respond to the EU's requests for cooperation -- as we have with force protection for EU police in Afghanistan (Ref B) -- we lower EU confidence in a partnership with the U.S.

¶19. (C/NF) The present U.S.-EU atmospherics are very favorable. General Petraeus' meeting with the Political and Security Committee energized our interlocutors. The Vice President was able raise the EU bar on Afghanistan. The President has made clear our support for partnership with European defense. There has never been a better context for matching EU resources to pressing international tests. We have an opportunity to accomplish this now and need to consider the next steps.